Some theorists in meta-ethics have recently defended so-called 'meta-ethical pluralism', which denies that ordinary moral discourse is uniform, instead claiming that it contains several different concepts of morality. But critics have objected that such a theory cannot adequately explain both moral and meta-ethical disagreement, because the use of, or focus on, different concepts, respectively, means that speakers in these contexts would frequently end up talking past each other instead of having a genuine disagreement. In response, I will argue that, in both cases, pluralism leaves more room for disagreement than its critics have thought: in ordinary moral discourse, speakers could still (__________). And that undermines any immediate inference from the presence of disagreement to the falsity of pluralism.

① disagree about content that is communicated as a matter of pragmatics rather than semantics

② agree on the significance of communicating about moral matters

③ reach a consensus through shared experiences of moral education

④ interact successfully by means of logical inference in a dialogue

⑤ show explicit evidence by citing real case studies

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